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Construction Law
by Frank 0. Brown, Jr.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article focuses on a few noteworthy construction law decisions by
Georgia appellate courts between June 1, 2010 and May 31, 2011.'
II. BUILDING CODES
In Lumsden v. Williams,2 the plaintiffs, a home buyer and his wife,
sued the home builders alleging that their home had not been constructed in compliance with the International Residential Code (IRC)
standards.' The builders moved for summary judgment. The plaintiffs
responded with expert affidavits stating that the home failed to comply
with the IRC.' However, the trial court determined that the Council of
American Building Officials (CABO),' rather than the IRC, was the
applicable code.' As urged by the builder, the trial court concluded that
the Department of Community Affairs (DCA) had exceeded its authority
in adopting the IRC because, while the DCA was authorized to adopt a
later edition of the CABO code,' the IRC was not merely a later edition

* Shareholder in Weissman, Nowack, Curry & Wilco, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. General
Counsel, Greater Atlanta Home Builders Association, Inc. Rhodes College (B.A., 1976);
Emory University School of Law (J.D., 1979). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of Georgia construction law during the prior survey period, see
Frank 0. Brown, Jr., Construction Law, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 62 MERCER L. REV.
71 (2010).
2. 307 Ga. App. 163, 704 S.E.2d 458 (2010).
3. Georgia State Amendments to the CABO One and Two Family Dwelling Code, GA.
COMP. R. & REGS. 110-11-1-.11 (2002).
4. Lumsden, 307 Ga. App. at 164-66, 704 S.E.2d at 461-62.

5. Id. at 165, 704 S.E.2d at 461.
6.
7.
8.

CABO ONE AND Two FAMILY DWELLING CODE (1989) thereinafter CABO Code].
Lumsden, 307 Ga. App. at 166, 704 S.E.2d at 462.
O.C.G.A. § 8-2-20(9)(A)(ii) (2004).
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of the CABO code.' Because the IRC did not apply and the affidavits
from the plaintiffs' experts were premised on its being the applicable
code, the trial court struck the expert affidavits and granted the builder
summary judgment on the claims of IRC violations.' These rulings
were upheld on appeal.u The Georgia Court of Appeals noted, however, that nothing in the trial court's rulings prevented the plaintiffs from
12
relying on CABO code violations in support of their remaining claims.
III.

PRODUCT-RELATED CLAIMS

In R & R Insulation Services, Inc. v. Royal Indemnity Co.," "a fire
occurred in an oven at a chicken processing plant" owned by the
plaintiff." The plaintiff and its subrogors (collectively referred to as
the owner) filed suit for $260 million against the manufacturer of Class
C rated fiberglass-reinforced plastic panels (Class C FRP) and the
contractor that installed them." The owner alleged that the manufacturer failed to appropriately test the Class C FRP in foreseeable end
uses, specifically including installations using nylon rivets, which led to
misrepresentations by the manufacturer about the products "actual
combustibility and flame spread properties" and its mislabeling as a
Class C interior finish." The owner contended that it relied on the
incorrect label when having the Class C FRP installed at its plant and
that the mislabeling resulted in the spread of the fire. The owner
alleged that the defendant contractor failed to sufficiently warn the
owner about the combustibility of the Class C FRP. Also, the owner
alleged that the contractor failed either to use metal, rather than nylon,
fasteners with the Class C FRP or to select and install Class A FRP
instead. The owner contended that these failures resulted in the spread
of the fire."
The Georgia Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in
denying the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's
negligence per se claim because, even if the defendants were required by
the Life Safety Code to test the Class C FRP in actual end-use conditions, the plaintiff's own expert admitted that the Class C FRP met the

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Lumsden, 307 Ga. App. at 166, 704 S.E.2d at 462.
Id. at 167-68, 704 S.E.2d at 463.
Id. at 168, 704 S.E.2d at 463.
Id.
307 Ga. App. 419, 705 S.E.2d 223 (2010).
Id. at 419, 705 S.E.2d at 228.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Life Safety Code standards for such materials." Thus, any failure to
test was not the proximate cause of the alleged fire and the associated
damage." The court of appeals noted that "[a] showing of negligence
per se, however, does not establish liability per se. Breach of duty alone
does not make a defendant liable in negligence."
The manufacturer contended that the trial court erred by denying its
motion for summary judgment as to the owner's claims that it had
"failed to adequately warn of the dangers of installing . .. Class C FRP
in ceiling applications with nylon rivets."2 1 The court of appeals
disagreed, reasoning, in part, that it is foreseeable that the public will
rely on a manufacturer's recommendations for installation of a product,
which, in this case, included recommendations by the manufacturer for
the use of FRP using nylon rivets.22 Thus, whether the manufacturer
breached a duty to warn of dangers and whether such breach proximately caused the fire damages were jury issues.2 3 Other jury issues
included: whether the owner was a sophisticated user to whom the
manufacturer owed no warning," whether the manner and speed at
which the Class C FRP would burn should have been obvious to the
owner,2 5 and whether the use of FRP with nylon rivets was the
proximate cause of the fire."
The contractor contended that the trial court erred by denying its
motion for summary judgment on its alleged failure to warn about
dangers of installing Class C FRP with nylon rivets." The court of
appeals agreed.28 The court held that the contractor had no duty to
warn because there was no evidence that the contractor had actual or
constructive knowledge that the use of nylon rivets might create a
problem.2 9 The contractor further argued that "the trial court erred by
denying its motion for summary judgment as to its alleged failure to
suggest installation of Class A FRP or warn against installing Class C

18. Id. at 425-26, 705 S.E.2d at 232.
19. Id. at 425, 705 S.E.2d at 232.
20. Id. at 425, 705 S.E.2d at 231 (quoting Brazier v. Phoenix Grp. Mgmt., 280 Ga. App.
67. 70, 633 S.E.2d 354, 357 (2006)). The plaintiffs counsel also admitted during oral
argument that the Class C FRP itself was not the basis for the plaintiffs claims. Id. at
426, 705 S.E.2d at 232.
21. Id. at 427, 705 S.E.2d at 233.
22. Id. at 428, 705 S.E.2d at 234.
23. Id. at 428, 705 S.E.2d at 233.
24. Id. at 428-29, 705 S.E.2d at 234.
25. Id. at 429, 705 S.E.2d at 234.
26. Id. at 429-30, 705 S.E.2d at 234-35.
27. Id. at 430, 705 S.E.2d at 235.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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FRP."o Again, the court of appeals agreed with the contractor,
reasoning in part that installers have no common law duty to suggest
the best product, the owner was aware of the same manufacturer's
warnings about Class C FRP as was the contractor, and the owner itself
had installed Class C FRP on the walls of the oven room.31
IV.

SPOLIATION

In R & R Insulation Services, Inc. v. Royal Indemnity Co.,32 the
contractor and the manufacturer "contend [ed] that the trial court abused
its discretion by denying their joint motion for sanctions, specifically,
dismissal of the case, for [the plaintiff plant owner]'s alleged spoliation
of evidence."" The Georgia Court of Appeals agreed that the owner
spoliated evidence and that the defendants had been prejudiced by that
spoliation.3 4 But, it affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendants'
motion for sanctions for spoliation because the only sanction the
defendants requested was dismissal, which generally requires evidence
of malicious spoliation, and such evidence was lacking."

V.

INDEMNIFICATION

In Cagle Construction,LLC v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,36 the contractor contracted with the Georgia Department of Defense (GDOD) to
perform four projects. The contractor provided a performance and
payment bond to the GDOD and signed a general indemnity in favor of
the bond issuer. The GDOD declared the contractor in default and
demanded that the bond issuer complete the project, which it did. The
bond issuer then sued the contractor to recover the amount spent in
completing the projects, plus attorney and consultant fees. The trial
court denied the contractor's motion for summary judgment based on the
applicable statute of limitation and granted the bond issuer's motion for
summary judgment on its claims. On appeal, the contractor first argued
that summary judgment against it on liability was inappropriate because
it denied being in default.3 The Georgia Court of Appeals disagreed,
holding that, under the terms of the indemnity agreement, the contractor's liability was triggered by the GDOD's declaration of default and the

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 431, 705 S.E.2d at 235.
Id. at 431, 705 S.E.2d at 236.
307 Ga. App. 419, 705 S.E.2d 223 (2010).
Id. at 435, 705 S.E.2d at 238 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 437, 705 S.E.2d at 239.
Id. at 438-39, 705 S.E.2d at 240-41.
305 Ga. App. 666, 700 S.E.2d 658 (2010).
Id. at 666-68, 700 S.E.2d at 659-61.
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payment of completion costs by the bond issuer, and the bond issuer was
not required to prove the contractor actually defaulted on the projects."'
The contractor's second argument was that there was a factual issue
regarding the damages claimed by the bond issuer. As evidence of its
damages, the bond issuer attached an affidavit summarizing the
In response, the
amounts incurred in completing the projects."
contractor filed an affidavit stating that "there was no where [sic] near
this value of work still to be completed and that these are not reasonable
charges. .. ."' The court of appeals determined that the contractor's
affidavit was conclusory, speculative, and did not raise an issue of
fact.4 ' Moreover, the court noted that the indemnity agreement
provided that, in the event of payment by the bond issuer, the contractor
would "accept the voucher or other evidence of such payment as prima
facie evidence of the propriety" of the payment and the contractor's
liability for that amount.4 2 Absent evidence of bad faith or direct
evidence that the bond issuer did not incur the expenses, the contractor
was bound by that agreement. 3
The contractor's third argument was that the one-year statute of
limitation applicable to actions on a payment bond under Georgia's Little
Miller Act, section 13-10-65 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated
(O.C.G.A.), 44 barred the bond issuer's claims.4 5 The court of appeals
disagreed, noting that the subject claim was not on a payment bond but
was on the indemnity agreement." Because that agreement was under
seal, the twenty-year statute of limitation under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-23 4
applied.4 8
VI.

ARBITRATION

In Atlantic Station, LLC v. Vratsinas Construction Co.,49 the agreement between the owner and the contractor contained an arbitration
provision applicable to claims under that agreement. The contractor
filed a demand for arbitration. Eighteen months after commencement

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 668, 700 S.E.2d at 660-61.
Id. at 668-69, 700 S.E.2d at 661.
Id. at 669, 700 S.E.2d at 661 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 667, 700 S.E.2d at 660.
Id. at 669, 700 S.E.2d at 661.
O.C.G.A. § 13-10-65 (2010).
Cagle, 305 Ga. App. at 669, 700 S.E.2d at 661.
Id. at 669-70, 700 S.E.2d at 661-62.
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-23 (2007).
Cagle, 305 Ga. App. at 670, 700 S.E.2d at 662.
307 Ga. App. 398, 705 S.E.2d 191 (2010).
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of the arbitration, the owner filed a motion in court to stay the
arbitration, contending that it had just learned during depositions taken
within the last thirty days that the contractor was seeking to recover for
work that fell outside the parties' agreement and outside the scope of the
arbitration agreement. The trial court denied the motion for stay.o
On appeal by the owner, the Georgia Court of Appeals focused on
whether the owner had waived any right to stay the arbitration by
participating in it for eighteen months, with the court holding that the
owner had waived any such right." In reaching that decision, the
court rejected the owner's contention that it had just learned of claims
outside of the agreement, reasoning that the earlier demand and the
amended demand for arbitration should have alerted the owner to those
claims.5 2
The court also rejected the owner's contention that it had an absolute
right to stay the arbitration because it filed the motion to stay within
thirty days after the contractor filed another amendment to the demand
for arbitration." The owner relied on O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6(d)" in making
that argument."
O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6(d) states: "After service of the
demand, or any amendment thereof, the party served must make
application within 30 days to the court for a stay of arbitration or he will
thereafter be precluded from denying the validity of the agreement. . . ."" The court reasoned that, standing alone, O.C.G.A. § 9-96(d) seems to support the owner's position but that O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6(d)
must be construed with O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6(b)," which states in relevant
part the following: "Subject to subsections (c) and (d) of this Code
section, a party who has not participated in the arbitration and who has
not made an application to compel arbitration may apply to stay
arbitration on the grounds that: (1) No valid agreement to submit to
arbitration was made."" The court noted that the owner would have
had the right to seek a stay of the arbitration, despite having participated in it, if the recent amendment had presented an entirely new and
different issue."

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 398-400, 705 S.E.2d at 192-93.
Id. at 401-02, 705 S.E.2d at 193-94.
Id. at 401-02, 705 S.E.2d at 194.
Id. at 402-03, 705 S.E.2d at 194-95.
O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6(d) (2007).
Atlantic Station, 307 Ga. App. at 402-03, 705 S.E.2d at 194-95.
O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6(d).
O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6(b) (2007).
Atlantic Station, 307 Ga. App. at 402-03, 705 S.E.2d at 194-95; O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6(b).
Atlantic Station, 307 Ga. App. at 403, 705 S.E.2d at 195.
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RIGHT TO REPAIR ACT

In Lumsden v. Williams,"o the buyer of a house and his wife provided
written notice of alleged construction defects to the builders/sellers."
The notice, however, did not comply with the notice of claim requirements provided by O.C.G.A. § 8-2-38,62 in what is commonly referred
to as the Right to Repair Act (Act).63 The Act is a mandatory statutory
alternative dispute resolution process designed to resolve residential
construction defect disputes before presenting disputes in court or in
arbitration. When the builders did not respond to the satisfaction of
the buyer and his wife, the buyers had remedial repairs made, at least
some of which, they contended, mitigated damages."
The buyer and his wife then sued the builders. The builders
responded with a motion to dismiss for failure to provide a notice of
claim.66 The trial court did not dismiss the action but stayed it
pending compliance with the Act.6

The buyers then provided a notice

of claim, but the parties did not resolve their disputes under the Act,
and thus, the suit continued. The builders filed a motion for summary
judgment on a number of grounds, including that the buyers could not
recover damages relating to the remedial repairs made prior to providing
the notice of claim. The trial court granted summary judgment on that
basis."
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that while the

remedial repairs "may create a jury issue as to any potential damages,"
they do not justify summary judgment.6 ' The court added that
"[niothing in the act prevents a potential claimant from taking action to
mitigate his losses." 70

60. 307 Ga. App. 163, 704 S.E.2d 458 (2010).
61. Id. at 164-65, 704 S.E.2d at 461.
62. O.C.G.A. § 8-2-38 (2004 & Supp. 2010).
63. Lumsden, 307 Ga. App. at 165, 704 S.E.2d at 461; see also O.C.G.A. §§ 8-2-35 to -43
(2004 & Supp. 2010).
64. O.C.G.A. § 8-2-35.
65. Lumsden, 307 Ga. App. at 164-65, 704 S.E.2d at 461.
66. Id. at 165, 704 S.E.2d at 461.
67. Id.; see also O.C.GA. § 8-2-37 (providing that, upon motion by a party, the trial
court shall stay an action subject to the Act when the claimant has not complied with the
preconditions to a legal action).
68. Lumsden, 307 Ga. App. at 165, 704 S.E.2d at 461.
69. Id. at 169, 704 S.E.2d at 463.
70. Id.
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STATUTE OF LIMITATION

In Smith v. Hilltop Pools & Spas, Inc.," a pool owner sued a pool
contractor for damages to the pool resulting from the pool being
constructed atop buried garbage. The trial court granted summary
judgment to the contractor.7 2 On appeal, the owner argued that the
trial court erred in determining that "his breach of contract and
negligence claims were barred by the six-year statute of limitation"
applicable to written contracts." The owner contended that the sixyear period did not commence at the substantial completion of the pool
but, rather, at the later date by which the contractor had promised, but
failed, to replace the pool liner.74 The Georgia Court of Appeals
rejected the owner's contention, reasoning that the alleged breach-the
construction of the pool on garbage-occurred no later than substantial
completion, and the later breach of the promise to replace the pool liner
did not extend the commencement date of the six-year statute of
limitation."
IX.

STATUTE OF REPOSE

In Rosenberg v. Falling Water, Inc.,16 more than ten years after
substantial completion of a house, the third owner of the house sued the
builder for personal injury suffered during the collapse of a deck
constructed by the builder. In addition to negligence, the homeowner
contended that the builder committed fraud by constructing the deck in
a manner that concealed its defects." Based on the constructionrelated statute of repose in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51,'8 the trial court granted
the builder's motion for summary judgment." That decision was
affirmed by the Georgia Court of Appeals."o
Before the Georgia Supreme Court, the homeowner again urged that
the builder should be equitably estopped from asserting the statute of
repose because of the builder's alleged fraudulent concealment of the

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

306 Ga. App. 881, 703 S.E.2d 424 (2010).
Id. at 881-82, 703 S.E.2d at 425-26.
Id. at 883, 703 S.E.2d at 426.
Id. at 883-84, 703 S.E.2d at 426-27.
Id.
289 Ga. 57, 709 S.E.2d 227 (2011).
Id. at 57-58, 709 S.E.2d at 228-29.
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51 (2007).
Rosenberg, 289 Ga. at 59, 709 S.E.2d at 229.
Id.
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defects in the deck."' The court rejected that argument by distinguishing cases that applied equitable estoppel to a statute of repose defense." In those cases, the court noted the injury occurred prior to the
expiration of the statute of repose and the defendant misled the plaintiff
about the cause of the injuries.83 To the contrary, in this case, the
homeowner's injuries did not happen until after the statute of repose
expired; therefore, no action by the builder could have deterred the
homeowner from thereafter asserting his claim prior to the expiration of
the statute of repose.&
X.

GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE

In American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Co. v. Hathaway
Development Co., a general contractor sued a plumbing subcontractor's general liability carrier for recovery of a default judgment that the
general contractor had obtained against the subcontractor. 6 The trial
court granted summary judgment to the insurer, reasoning that coverage
was lacking because there was no "occurrence" under the general
liability policy." The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed.8 "
The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
the court of appeals had erred in construing the term "occurrence.""
The policy defined occurrence as "an accident, including continuous or
repeated exposure to substantially the same, general harmful conditions."o The policy did not define "accident."91 The supreme court
stated that it would therefore apply the commonly accepted meaning of
accident as used in general liability policies.92 It offered several similar
examples of that meaning, including "an unexpected happening
[without intention or design"" and "injuries or damage neither

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
S.E.2d

Id.
Id. at 59-61, 709 S.E.2d at 229-30.
Id. at 59, 709 S.E.2d at 229.
See id. at 59-61, 709 S.E.2d at 229-30.
288 Ga. 749, 707 S.E.2d 369 (2011).
Id. at 750, 707 S.E.2d at 370.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 749-50, 707 S.E.2d at 370.
Id. at 750, 707 S.E.2d at 370 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 750-51, 707 S.E.2d at 371.
Id. at 751, 707 S.E.2d at 371.
Id. (quoting City of Atlanta v. St. Paul Fire & Ins. Co., 231 Ga. App. 206, 208, 498
782, 784 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured."' Applying
these similar definitions, the supreme court held that "an occurrence can
arise where faulty workmanship causes unforeseen or unexpected
damage to other property."' The court rejected the insurer's contention that its insured's acts could not be deemed an occurrence or accident
because they were performed intentionally, stating: "[A] deliberate act,
performed negligently, is an accident if the effect is not the intended or
expected result; that is, the result would have been different had the
deliberate act been performed correctly."'
XI.

WARRANTY AND PUNCH LISTS

At the home's transactional closing, the buyer and builders/sellers in
Lumsden v. Williams" signed a "Walk Through List of items to be
completed after closing" (List) that stated that the List "shall amend the
prior Agreement of the parties."' The prior agreement was the
purchase agreement." The List stated that the builder provided a oneyear guarantee "on [the] basement not leaking."co The parties also
agreed that the closing attorney would hold $10,000 in escrow until the
items on the List were completed.'0 1 A few months after closing, the
parties added a handwritten stipulation on the List that stated the List
"has been completed" and that $9,300 of the escrowed funds were to be
paid to the builder and $700 to the buyer and his wife "due to expenses
incurred in accomplishing certain items on [the] walk through list and
[for] other expenses.l 02
The buyer and his wife thereafter sued the builders for defects relating
to items on the List. The builders sought, and the trial court granted,
summary judgment as to those defects, reasoning that there had been an
accord and satisfaction as to items on the List.'
The Georgia Court
of Appeals reversed, determining that, while the handwritten stipulation
established as a matter of law that the builders performed the repairs
on the List and that the buyer and his wife received their portion of the

94.

Id. (quoting U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., 979 So. 2d 871,883 (Fla. 2007)) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

95. Id. at 752, 707 S.E.2d at 372.
96.

Id. (quoting Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex.

2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. 307 Ga. App. 163, 704 S.E.2d 458 (2010).
98. Id. at 164, 704 S.E.2d at 460 (internal quotation marks omitted).
99.

See id.

100. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
101. Id.
102. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
103.

Id. at 169, 704 S.E.2d at 464.
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costs associated with those repairs, a jury issue remained as to whether
the stipulation resolved construction quality issues. 104
The trial court also granted summary judgment to the builders on the
warranty claims, finding that the one-year guarantee against basement
leaks found in the List superseded the one-year general warranty in the
The trial court based that conclusion on the
purchase agreement.'
List's provision that it "shall amend the prior agreement of the
The court noted that
parties."'o The court of appeals reversed.'
the List did not state that it superseded the purchase agreement or its
one-year general warranty and held that a jury would have to decide
whether the parties intended for it to do so and, if so, whether the buyer
received consideration for such an agreement. 0 8
The trial court also granted summary judgment to the builders on the
warranty claims, reasoning, in part, that notice of a warranty claim had
to be provided within the one-year warranty period.'09 The court of
appeals reversed, stating, in part, that while the warranty clearly
applied only to defects that arose during the warranty period, it did not
require notice of a warranty claim within that period because it did not
include such a requirement.no
XII.

CONCLUSION

The cases discussed in this Article are some of the significant Georgia
appellate decisions during the period between June 1, 2010 and May 31,
2011. Other significant decisions during this period include: Weinstock
v. Novare Group, Inc. (fraud);" Madison Retail Suwanee, LLC v.
Orion Enterprises Sales & Service, Inc. (mechanics' and materialmen's
liens);112 Effingham County Board of Commissioners v. Park West
Effingham, L.R (impact fees);"' Helms v. Franklin Builders, Inc.,'11
and South Point Retail Partners, LLC v. North American Properties
Atlanta, Ltd. (arbitration);"' Lumsden v. Williams (acceptance doc-

104.

Id. at 170, 704 S.E.2d at 464.

105. Id.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 170, 704 S.E.2d at 465.
Id. at 170, 704 S.E.2d at 464-65.
Id. at 170-71, 704 S.E.2d at 465.

110.

Id.

111.

309 Ga. App. 351, 710 S.E.2d 150 (2011).

112.
113.
114.
115.

309
308
305
304

Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.

App.
App.
App.
App.

712,
680,
863,
419,

711
708
700
696

S.E.2d
S.E.2d
S.E.2d
S.E.2d

71 (2011).
619 (2011).
609 (2010).
136 (2010).
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trine);"' HNTB Georgia, Inc. v. Hamilton King (expert testimony);1 7
and Electric Works CMA, Inc. v. Baldwin Technical Fabrics, LLC
(Prompt Pay Act). 18

116.
117.
118.

307 Ga. App. 163, 704 S.E.2d 458 (2010).
287 Ga. 641, 697 S.E.2d 770 (2010).
306 Ga. App. 705, 703 S.E.2d 124 (2010); see also O.C.G.A. tit. 13, ch. 11 (2010).

